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According to the mental models theory (Johnson-Laird, 
1983, 1993, 2001; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), condi-
tional reasoning is based on the construction of mental mod-
els of the premises and drawing conclusions from them. The 
number of models required in a reasoning task is the main 
predictor of the difficulty of the task. Besides the number of 
models, another factor that can affect conditional reasoning 
is the directionality of premises (Evans, 1993). In our previ-
ous research we have demonstrated the strong conditional 
directionality effect on the speed and accuracy of condi-
tional inference verification (Valerjev, Bajšanski, & Gulan, 
2010). In the study presented here, we examined the effects 
of the spatial orientation of antecedent and consequent, as 
well as the directionality of premises on conditional reason-
ing. 
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Directionality of conditionals in the context of visual priming
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The theory of mental models is used to explain the differences in the effectiveness when deriving different types 
of conclusions such as modus ponens (MP) and modus tollens (MT). This difference is seen as a result of differ-
ent number of mental models that are required in order to construct a valid conclusion. The theory explains mental 
models as a type of mental representations that can have abstract content, but can also contain perceptive and spatial 
information. These models are content and context sensitive, e.g., directionality of the conditionals affects the ef-
fectiveness of conclusions alongside the number of models required. Contemporary studies have shown that many 
cognitive processes (e.g., the understanding of sentences) have a significant perceptual basis. Research presented 
here tested the possibility of perceptual grounding of deductive reasoning. Prime stimulus served as a context for 
mental model construction. The direction of conditionals (either the antecedent preceded the consequent or vice 
versa) and spatial orientation expressed in the content of the conditional have been used as critical perceptual fea-
tures. A four-factor experiment was carried out with perceptual priming, conditional direction, and the conclusion 
type manipulated as independent factors. The participants’ task was to decide as quickly as possible whether the 
presented conditional conclusion was right or wrong. Visual priming, as well as conditional directionality, showed 
a significant effect on both MP and MT types of conclusions. It is interesting that the effect of perceptual priming 
for MT was in the opposite direction when compared to the MP one. These findings support the assumption that 
mental models could be perceptually grounded. It also implies that mental models can be manipulated through the 
perceptive context.
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Deductive reasoning
The differences between the normative theory of deduc-
tion and human performance have been firmly established. 
The normative theory of deduction has been described by 
first-order logic, or more precisely, with the predicate cal-
culus and proposition calculus. According to logical rules, 
conditional inference is described by a logical relation 
called implication that is always true except when the ante-
cedent is true and the consequent is false. 
Human performance is only partially rational and logi-
cal, and this has been demonstrated in many examples. 
There are also typical biases in human conditional reason-
ing. A good theory of deductive reasoning has to explain 
most of the observed phenomena. Three main groups of 
theories emerged, all aiming to explain deductive reasoning: 
the formal rules theories (Braine & O’Brian, 1991; Braine, 
Reiser, & Rumain, 1984; Rips, 1983, 1990, 1994), the spe-
cific rules theories (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, 1989), and the 
mental model theory which is most interesting for research 
presented here. 
According to the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 
1983, 1993, 1999, 2001), when people reason they construct 
62
BAJŠANSKI, VALERJEV and GULAN, Directionality of conditionals and visual priming, Review of Psychology, 2013, Vol. 20, No. 1-2, 61-68
and manipulate with cognitive representations that are called 
mental models. Mental models are representations of states 
of affairs that are described by premises and that contain 
combinations of affairs that could be descriptions of valid 
conclusions. When we read or hear a sentence we construct 
an appropriate model. Some sentences can be represented 
with more than one model. For example, an exhaustive rep-
resentation of a conditional premise contains three mental 
models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) which is illustrated 
in the example below. The conditional If P, then Q. (e.g., If 
it rains, then streets are wet.) can be described with three 
possible mental models (and this is termed exhaustive rep-
resentation). 
[p] [q] [it rains]  [streets are wet]
[¬ p] [q] [it does not rain] [streets are wet]
[¬ p] [¬ q] [it does not rain]  [streets are not wet]
However, human cognition that deals with these mental 
models tends to be economical. When one reads the condi-
tional sentence, only the first model is initially constructed. 
Only if necessary, another two models are fleshed out. This 
is the main difference between modus ponens (MP) and mo-
dus tollens (MT) inferences. Modus ponens inference is a 
conditional syllogism in the form of:
If P, then Q. 
P. 
Therefore, Q.
While the form of MT is:
If P, then Q. 
Not Q. 
Therefore, not P.
According to mental model theory, reading the first con-
ditional premise leads to initial model construction. For a 
valid conclusion MP inference requires only the first model. 
However, MT inference requires all three models (or at least 
two in the case of biconditionals) for the conclusion to be 
valid. Therefore, MPs are a faster and more accurate type of 
inference than MTs. There are also mental models for other 
logical relations (e.g., conjunction, disjunction) and other 
forms of deductive reasoning. Mental models can also rep-
resent spatial relations, events, processes, and some opera-
tions of complex systems (Johnson-Laird, 2001). 
If the mental models represent spatial relations it may 
imply that they also include perceptual features. According 
to Johnson-Laird (2001), the mental models might originally 
evolve as the ultimate output of perceptual processes. How-
ever, it is important to point out that mental models should 
not be equalized with visual imagination. It is still question-
able how much of the mental model’s nature is visual and/or 
spatial. Some evidence suggests that the visual and spatial 
features of mental models can vary. 
Knauff and Johnson-Laird (2002) studied the effect of 
the type of relational terms on the three- and four-term se-
ries problems (also referred to as the linear syllogisms). In 
problems such as these, participants are asked to draw valid 
conclusion from premises which describe relations between 
three or four terms (for example, If the dog is cleaner than 
the cat, and the ape is dirtier than the cat does it follows that 
the dog is cleaner than the ape). Some of the relations in 
their study were easy to envisage visually and spatially (for 
example above-below), some were easy to envisage visually 
but hard to envisage spatially (cleaner-dirtier), and some 
relations were hard to envisage both visually and spatially 
(better-worse). When participants were asked to make con-
clusions they were most successful in the visuo-spatial tasks 
and least successful in the visual type. The authors con-
cluded that visuo-spatial representations facilitated better 
conclusions because attention was focused on the relevant 
aspects of the task. On the other hand, visual-only represen-
tations did the opposite. They unnecessary loaded the atten-
tion with the irrelevant details and made inference slower.
In another study, Jahn, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2007) 
used relational reasoning tasks. The participants’ task was to 
verify the offered orders of the letters. Relations like left 
from, right from, next to, between were used. Their study 
has shown that participants of western-cultural background 
have a tendency to order the models from left to right.
Another interesting effect that affects MP and MT rea-
soning was found by Girotto, Mazzocco, and Tasso (1997). 
They found that a different order of premises presentation 
(first the second premise, and then the conditional premise, 
e.g., Not Q. If P, then Q. Therefore, not P.) made MT infer-
ences more accurate. Such an order of premises activates 
the ¬ q model in working memory and makes the connec-
tion with ¬ p more likely. 
Valerjev et al. (2010) manipulated the order of the ante-
cedent and the consequent in the conditional premise. The 
results obtained showed that MPs were processed faster and 
more accurately in standard conditional order (antecedent – 
consequent), and less efficiently in inverse conditional order 
(consequent – antecedent). The effect was reversed for MT 
inferences. MTs were processed faster and more accurately 
in inverse order, and less efficiently in standard order. They 
concluded that MPs and MTs have an opposite reasoning 
direction. 
This research deals with conditional deductive reason-
ing and it is based on the following assumptions: 
1. According to the mental model theory of reasoning 
(Johnson-Laird, 2001), the number of models that need 
to be constructed in the reasoning task is the main pre-
dictor of task difficulty. Hence, there are differences in 
speed and accuracy between MP and MT types of con-
clusion.
2. The directionality of conditionals (which means con-
cluding from the antecedent to the consequent or vice 
versa) can affect the speed and accuracy of the conclu-
sion as demonstrated in our prior research. 
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3. The spatial orientation of an antecedent and a conse-
quent can play an important role during initial model 
construction and can be affected by visual priming.
The aim of this study was to explore the effects of the 
conclusion validity (valid/invalid), type of conditional con-
clusion (MP/MT), the directionality of conditionals (stand-
ard/inverse), and visual priming (congruent/incongruent) on 
the speed and accuracy of conditional inference verification.
METHOD
Participants and design
Thirty-eight psychology students (29 female) from the 
University of Rijeka and the University of Zadar partici-
pated in this study. Their age varied from 19 to 24 years 
with an average age of 20 years. All participants took part 
in all experimental situations. Experimental design was 2 
× 2 × 2 × 2 repeated measures design with four independ-
ent variables, each with two levels. Independent variables 
were the directionality of conditionals (standard, inverse), 
the form of conditional inference (MP, MT), visual prim-
ing (congruent, incongruent), and the validity of inference 
(valid, invalid). 
Materials and procedure
Experimental trials were presented in random order on 
a computer monitor. Participants had to evaluate 128 (eight 
in each experimental condition) conditional syllogisms. 
There were also 32 additional filler tasks that were random-
ly mixed with conditional syllogisms. The purpose of these 
filler tasks was to prevent the participant’s possible habitu-
ation to characteristic form of valid and invalid conditional 
tasks. 
The participants were instructed to keep their eyes 
fixed on the fixation cross that appeared in the middle of 
the screen. After that, the first premise that was presented 
for 2500 ms was followed by the presentation of a prime 
for 150 ms, and finally by the second premise and conclu-
sion, the presentation of which lasted until the participant 
responded (Figure 1). The participants’ task was to press the 
“yes” button if the conclusion was true, or the “no” button if 
the conclusion was false. The participants were instructed to 
react as quickly and accurately as possible. The instruction 
was followed by five practice tasks after which the partici-
pants were asked whether they needed more practice. When 
they said they were ready, the experimental situation trials 
began. 
Notice that response time was measured from the pres-
entation of the last event in trial. Every valid version of the 
task had its non-valid version. Thirty two additional valid 
and non-valid tasks were added as fillers to the total and the 
response time for them was not recorded. They had a differ-
ent syntax than the experimental tasks and their purpose was 
to avoid the emergence of association between syntax and 
answers. After the conclusion was presented, the participants 
had to verify it by pressing one of two buttons (“true” or 
“false”). They used their right forefinger for “true” answer 
and their left forefinger for “false” answer during the experi-
ment. In previous experiments with conditionals (Valerjev 
et al., 2010) the authors rotated the “true” and “false” side 
among participants. The results showed no difference in 
response time between these two types of answering. Also, 
several participants reported that it felt more natural for them 
when the “true” answer was on the right side. 
All tasks were in abstract form which combined letters 
and spatial sides (left-right). Eighteen different letters were 
used. Each task had a different combination of two letters. 
All letters were consonants, and care was taken that all pairs 
of letters used in these tasks had a front-behind spatial rela-
tion on the QWERTZ keyboard. In other words, not a single 
pair of letters was taken from the same row, and not a sin-
gle pair of letter had a clear left-right relation on keyboard. 
These tasks were presented in Croatian, but they were ab-
stract enough that they could be easily translated into any 
other language. Examples of the tasks below are in English. 
Besides validity, three independent variables were manipu-
lated through the tasks. The directionality of the conditional 
premise (standard or inverse) was manipulated by present-
ing the antecedent-consequent sequence or vice versa. The 
visual context was manipulated by the prime stimulus that 
Figure 1. Sequence of events in an experimental trial.
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occurred between the conditional and the second premise. 
The congruent context prime presented two letters in the 
same spatial left-right relation as it was stated in the con-
ditional and the incongruent context prime presented an 
opposite spatial relation. The type of conditional syllogism 
was manipulated by the second premise, the affirmation of 
the antecedent for MP, and the negation of the consequent 
for MT. The examples below illustrate the experimental ma-
nipulation. 
MP tasks
DIRECTIONALITY OF CONDITIONAL PREMISE
 STANDARD:  If V is left, then T is right.
 INVERSE:  T is right, if V is left.
VISUAL PRIMING
 CONGRUENT:  V T
 INCONGRUENT: T V
VALIDITY
 VALID:   V is left. Then, T is right.
 INVALID:  V is left. Then, T is not right.
Example: STANDARD/CONGRUENT/VALID
 If V is left, then T is right.
  V T
 V is left. Then, T is right.
MT tasks
DIRECTIONALITY OF CONDITIONAL PREMISE
 STANDARD: If F is left, then C is right.
 INVERSE: C is right, if F is left.
VISUAL PRIMING
 CONGRUENT:  F  C
 INCONGRUENT: C  F
VALIDITY
 VALID:  C is not right. Then, F is not left.
 INVALID:  C is not right. Then, F is left. 
Example: INVERSE/INCONGRUENT/INVALID
 C is right, if F is left.
  C F
 C is not right. Then, F is left.
RESULTS
The five participants who failed to produce at least one 
correct response in each of the 16 experimental conditions 
were excluded from the analysis. Thus, data for the remain-
ing 33 participants was analyzed. Mean reaction times and 
the percentage of the correct responses for each experimen-
tal condition are presented in Table 1.
In the analysis of response times, the participant medi-
ans of response times were calculated for each experimental 
condition, and the four-way repeated measures ANOVA was 
carried out on this data. A summary of ANOVA is presented 
in Table 2. The significant main effect of the validity of in-
ferences was obtained, F(1, 32) = 118.59, p < .01: invalid 
inferences took longer to verify (M = 2490 ms, SE = 269) 
than valid inferences (M = 1976 ms, SE = 220). A significant 
main effect was also obtained for the type of inference, F(1, 
32) = 69.74, p < .01: MP inferences were verified faster (M 
= 1890 ms, SE = 205) than MT inferences (M = 2576, SE = 
311). The interaction between validity and type of inference 
was also significant, F(1, 32) = 16.91, p < .01. 
Although the main effect of directionality was not sig-
nificant, its interaction with the type of inference was sig-
nificant, F(1, 32) = 36.75, p < .01. A post-hoc analysis (Dun-
can test) supported our hypothesis about the different effect 
of directionality on MP and MT inferences: MP inferences 
were verified faster in standard form (M = 1763 ms, SE = 
167) than in inverse form (M = 2017 ms, SE = 139), whereas 
MT inferences were verified faster in inverse (M = 2467 ms, 
SE = 230) than in standard form (M = 2686 ms, SE = 221). 
Our results failed to support the hypothesis about the ef-
fect of visual priming on verification times. The main ef-
fect of priming was not significant, and its interaction ef-
fects were also non-significant. However, the interaction 
Table 1
Percentages of correct responses and their mean response times (RT; in milliseconds) in verifying conclusions as a function of validity of inferences, infer-
ence type (modus ponens-modus tollens), directionality (standard-inverse), and visual priming (congruent-incongruent)
Standard congruent Standard incongruent Inverse congruent Inverse incongruent
% RT % RT % RT % RT
Valid MP 99 1408 98 1494 95 1632 97 1688
Valid MT 82 2590 84 2433 89 2334 89 2227
Invalid MP 84 1999 71 2149 77 2400 85 2346
Invalid MT 56 2873 61 2849 61 2678 56 2629
Note. MP = modus ponens; MT = modus tollens.
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between priming and the type of inference was marginally 
significant, F(1, 32) = 4.07, p = .052. We expected that MP 
inferences would be verified faster in a congruent condition 
and MT inferences in an incongruent condition. Although 
response times for congruent MPs were lower (M = 1860 
ms) than for incongruent MPs (M = 1919 ms), and they were 
lower for incongruent MTs (M = 2534 ms) than for congru-
ent MTs (M = 2619 ms), these differences were not statisti-
cally significant. 
Four-way repeated measures ANOVA was carried out 
for the proportions of the correct responses for each partici-
pant in each experimental condition. A summary of ANOVA 
is presented in Table 3. A significant main effect of validity 
of inferences was obtained, F(1, 32) = 157.0, p < .01: there 
were more correct responses for valid inferences (M = 0.92, 
SE = 0.04) than for invalid inferences (M = 0.69, SE = 0.04). 
A significant main effect was obtained for the type of infer-
ences, F(1, 32) = 96.29, p < .01, whereas MPs were verified 
more correctly (M = 0.88, SE = 0.02) than MTs (M = 0.72, 
SE = 0.05). The interaction between validity and type of in-
ference was also significant, F(1, 32) = 9.57, p < .01, and a 
three-way interaction between validity, inference type, and 
directionality was significant, F(1, 32) = 10.83, p < .01. A 
post-hoc analysis revealed that there were more correct re-
sponses for valid MT inferences in inverse (M = 0.89, SE = 
0.03) than in standard form (M = 0.83, SE = 0.04). However, 
the analysis for the number of correct responses didn’t re-
veal differences for MP inferences regarding the direction-
ality, as it was obtained in the analysis of reaction times. 
The three-way interaction between visual priming, in-
ference type, and directionality was significant, F(1, 32) = 
28.00, p < .01. A post hoc analysis revealed several effects. 
For standard MPs, there were more correct responses in 
congruent (M = 0.92, SE = 0.02) than in the incongruent 
priming condition (M = 0.84, SE = 0.02). The opposite pat-
tern was revealed for inverse MPs: there were more cor-
rect responses in the incongruent condition (M = 0.91, SE = 
0.02) than in the congruent condition (M = 0.86, SE = 0.02). 
For MT inferences, there were more correct responses in the 
congruent inverse condition (M = 0.75, SE = 0.03) than in 
the congruent standard condition (M = 0.69, SE = 0.02). Al-
though these results are far from decisive, they point to the 
possible effect of visual priming on the processing of MP 
and MT inferences: congruent priming facilitates MP infer-
ences in standard directionality form, and it facilitates MT 
inferences in inverse directionality form. Finally, a four-way 
interaction between all factors was also significant, F(1, 32) 
= 23.74, p < .01.
DISCUSSION
The effect of the type of inference (MP vs. MT) was 
not a surprise. In numerous studies MPs were verified more 
accurately than MTs (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), and 
in more recent studies with mental chronometry MPs were 
proved to be faster, too (e.g., Barrouillet, Grosset, & Lecas, 
2000; Valerjev, 2006; Valerjev et al., 2010). This effect is 
usually explained by the predictions of the mental model 
theory (Johnson-Laird, 2001). There is only one mental 
model needed for a valid MP conclusion. This mental model 
is constructed relatively early, while reading the first (condi-
tional) premise. The second premise only confirms the first 
Table 2
The effects of conclusion validity, type of inference, directionality, and 
visual priming on response times to verifying conclusions
Source df F
Validity (V) 1, 32 118.59**
Type of inference (TI) 1, 32 69.74**
Directionality (D) 1, 32 0.30
Visual priming (VP) 1, 32 0.17
V × TI 1, 32 16.91**
V × D 1, 32 0.77
V × VP 1, 32 0.25
TI × D 1, 32 36.75**
TI × VP 1, 32 4.07a
D × VP 1, 32 0.53
V × TI × D 1, 32 0.19
V × TI × VP 1, 32 1.11
V × D × VP 1, 32 0.63
TI × D × VP 1, 32 0.92
V × TI × D × VP 1, 32 0.13
ap = .052. **p < .001
Table 3
The effects of conclusion validity, type of inference, directionality, and 
visual priming on percentage of correct responses to verifying conclusions 
Source df F
Validity (V) 1, 32 157.00**
Type of inference (TI) 1, 32 96.29**
Directionality (D) 1, 32 1.93
Visual priming (VP) 1, 32 0.36
V × TI 1, 32 9.57*
V × D 1, 32 0.03
V × VP 1, 32 1.58
TI × D 1, 32 1.51
TI × VP 1, 32 0.84
D × VP 1, 32 2.44
V × TI × D 1, 32 10.83*
V × TI × VP 1, 32 0.33
V × D × VP 1, 32 2.93
TI × D × VP 1, 32 28.00**
V × TI × D × VP 1, 32 27.74**
*p < .01. **p < .001
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part of the model, and then the second part of the model 
emerges as a conclusion. This kind of conclusion is very 
natural and quite easy, and more than 96% of the answers 
were correct. On the other hand, MT is not as easy as MP. 
The second premise denies the consequent and the initial 
mental model is eliminated. The reasoner has to construct 
another valid model which contains the negation of the con-
sequent. This means that MP requires only one model, and 
MT requires three (or at least two) mental models. Hence, 
MT conclusions are harder, slower, and less accurate (76% 
in this study). The difference in the number of mental models 
was also a good explanation for differences in accuracy for 
many other types of conclusions (e.g., regular syllogisms or 
disjunctions; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). However, con-
ditionals are complex and since directionality effects were 
significant in this research, there will be more discussion on 
whether the MP vs. MT differences are explicable by a dif-
ferent number of necessary mental models alone. 
The effect of the validity of conclusion was also expect-
ed. It is common that valid conclusions are verified faster 
and more accurately than invalid conclusions. The same 
effect was obtained in our previous study (Valerjev et al., 
2010). Johnson-Laird (2001) explained that when reason-
ers construct models they focus on what is true and neglect 
what is false. It is easier for reasoners to evaluate the con-
clusion when their own derived conclusion is confirmed by 
the one offered. Otherwise, the reasoners have to search for 
alternative models (or combinations of the models) in the 
evaluation phase of the reasoning process, and this search 
makes the response time longer. 
The effect of directionality demonstrated that form mat-
ters: it is not the same if the conditionals are presented in the 
standard or in the inverse form. MPs are easier and faster 
to verify when the conditional premise is presented in the 
standard form. On the contrary, MTs are easier and faster 
to verify when the conditional premise is presented in the 
inverse form: consequent, if antecedent. This effect strongly 
suggests that processes of MP and MT reasoning have a di-
rection. When making an MP conclusion, reasoners make a 
mental move forward from antecedent to consequent, and 
when making MT conclusion they do the opposite, that is, 
they go backward. This effect has been demonstrated in 
several studies with different experimental procedures. The 
first hints that the directed nature of the conditional reason-
ing is possible was suggested by Barrouillet and his col-
leagues (2000). They used four types of inference – MP, 
MT, NA (negation of the antecedent), and AC (affirmation 
of the consequent) – and standard direction in conditional 
premise. Note that NA and AC are logically invalid conclu-
sions, but human reasoners often derive conclusions from 
them. What is important here is that reasoning with MP 
and NA has a “normal” direction, from the antecedent to 
the consequent, and AC and MT reasoning have the “op-
posite” direction. The results obtained were in line with this 
assumption. MP and NA conclusions were faster than AC 
and MT conclusions. Similar results were obtained in Valer-
jev’s (2006) research on the same four types of conditional 
inference. In another study, Valerjev et al. (2010) used the 
inverse conditionals, as well as the standard. The inverse 
conditionals proved to facilitate faster MT conclusions and 
slowed the MP conclusions, when compared to the reaction 
times obtained on standard conditionals. The very same ef-
fect was obtained in the present study using the same para-
digm. According to classic mental model theory, the mental 
model(s) for the conditional should be the same every time, 
if the content of the conditional is identical. However, this 
research showed that this is not the case. The representa-
tion of the conditional premise was affected by the order 
of occurrence of antecedent and consequent. It seems that 
not only the content of the mental model, but also the form 
of the mental model can be manipulated. We assume that 
the mental models that represent the conditionals have more 
attributes than content alone, and some of these attributes, 
such as the directionality, can be manipulated by the form 
of conditional, and possibly by the context and the prem-
ise presentation order. This assumption is still not studied 
enough and it requires a more detailed empirical verifica-
tion. Our position is similar to Evans and Over’s (2004). 
They explained that their approach could be classified as 
a theory of mental models. However, they consider that 
classic mental model theory needs a revision. According 
to them, the classic mental model approach interpreted the 
conditional too tensely – as a functional conditional which 
was based on extensive logic. Such conditional unambigu-
ously defines mental models. In other words, the classic 
theory suggests that mental models are constructed in the 
uniform way. Evans and Over disagree and claim that more 
features like the directionality of conditionals, the degrees 
of certainty, confidence, and probability that people associ-
ate to conditionals should be taken into account when deal-
ing with mental models.
In this research visual priming served as a context that 
should emphasize the possible visual or visuo-spatial nature 
of the mental models. If the visuo-spatial part of the model 
exists, the reasoning should be facilitated with the congruent 
prime stimulus, or slowed down by the incongruent prime 
stimulus for both MP and MT types of inference. Remember 
that the visual prime was made by two letters positioned on 
left and right side of the computer monitor. It was assumed 
that such visual prime would interfere with the visuo-spatial 
aspect of the mental model that is based on the content of 
the model. For example, the conditional premise “If T is 
left, then G is right” can, according to the mental model 
theory, activate the visuo-spatial mental model of the form:
 T G
When the congruent prime stimulus (T G) or the incon-
gruent prime stimulus (G T) appears on the screen it should 
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have the same effect on both MP and MT conclusion. How-
ever, the main effect of the visual priming was not signifi-
cant. 
The interaction between the priming (congruent-incon-
gruent) and the inference type (MP-MT) was marginally 
significant (p = .052). If the interaction effect was proven 
significant, the congruent visual priming would facilitate 
the verification of the MPs and slowed down the verifica-
tion of the MTs. The incongruent visual priming would slow 
down the MPs and facilitated the MTs.
The analysis of the number of correct responses re-
vealed that the congruent priming facilitated MP inferences 
in standard directionality form, and it facilitated MT infer-
ences in inverse directionality form. These results points to 
the possibility that the effect of congruence of visual prim-
ing is more complex than we expected. 
One methodological problem of this study is that we ex-
pected for spatial properties of conditionals to be activated 
by a left-right relation. However, it might be that this rela-
tion is not salient enough (Franklin & Tversky, 1990). The 
left-right relation is a relativistic relation (when two people 
are faced to each other what is left to one is right to the 
other), and it can often be confusing, especially in the con-
text of logical conclusions. Perhaps another spatial relation 
should be used. For example, up-down, or in front-behind 
relations could be more salient. 
To conclude, the MP inferences were verified faster and 
more accurately than the MT inferences in all conditions. 
The reason for this lies in the fact that the MT inferences 
need more mental models than the MP inferences. Still, this 
study has shown that the number of mental models was not 
the only factor that determined the differences in reasoning 
with the conditionals. The MP inferences were processed 
faster in the standard form than in the inverse form of the 
conditional premise. The opposite pattern was obtained for 
MT inferences, which were processed faster in the inverse 
than in the standard form of conditional premise. The direc-
tionality of the conditional interfered with different direc-
tions of reasoning for MPs and MTs, from the antecedent 
to the consequent or vice-versa. The directionality seems to 
be an important property of the mental model and it can sig-
nificantly affect the speed of reasoning. Finally, although we 
failed to demonstrate the clear effect of congruence of vis-
ual priming on conditional reasoning, the obtained results 
call for further investigation of visual and spatial properties 
of mental models. 
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The Editorial board of Review of Psychology is paying 
special attention to the legal and legitimate use of psycho-
logical tests, and the precise citing of the instruments used 
in studies to be published. In the preceding journal issue, 
however, we overlooked information published in the ar-
ticle by Koso et al. (Rev. Psychol. 19 (2) (2012) 131-139.) 
who used Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition 
(WAIS- III; Wechsler, 1997) as cited in the first submitted 
version of the manuscript. Since in the reviewing proce-
dures it was asked from authors to refer to a translated form 
of the test, the published version of the article includes dif-
ERRATUM
ferent reference – Berger, J., Marković, M., & Mitić, M. M. 
(1995). Vekslerov individualni test inteligencije – priručnik 
(Wechsler Individual Test of Intelligence – Manual) which 
was in the Reference section translated as Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale – Manual.  As the cited instrument is not 
originally used by the authors nor approved by Psychologi-
cal Corporation, that is, Pearson Assessment as the present 
owner of the WAIS, we wish to apologize to anyone who 
might consider insulted by this fact.
Editor

